Traditionalism, Lawson's closure, and other properties

You know, I've been thinking about your notion that I am a traditionalist, or at least harkening back to something.

Well, while the ideas I present are 'a vindication of ontology' as others have put so well, I do not believe my arguments represent a traditionalism.

In fact, considering it is in part a non-real metaphysics (realism being the 'traditional' idea that something exists separate from and beyond us), it really is antithetical in any traditionalist sense.

Yet I do agree with your assessment that there is a 'traditionalism', and I'd like to attempt to define it:

I am a realist in that I do believe something exists separate from and beyond us, yet I am not willing to commit to the notion that because it does so, we can somehow know all of it and define it with precision (as is the outcome of both idealism and realism, now enacted in the warping growth we know as empiricism and positivism).

So while something is separate and beyond, it is not totally 'separate' and 'beyond' in that these are linguistic closures, and as such, are congealed in, into, and out of openness.

So openness is that which is separate from and beyond, yet that which we are intimately connected to and cannot define beyond (in all and through all of our closures, material or not).

I think this is simply a result of the fact that something is differentiated and stratified above us. In a sociological sense, there is both structure and agency, separate from and beyond each other but intimately connected and inter-related.

It is that inter-relatedness and its generative forms that we conceive as reality (which is the domain that encompasses the actual and the empirical).

To truly define it, we believe we have to step outside of it, compare it to the world as completely vitiated from the observer (this in spanish is 'ciencia vulgar').

But we do not have to, in fact we cannot. We can only hold that which is potential (or open), that which is differential, as one, through the process of closure, or congealing around what I like to call the 'strings of existent'. But again, it is we who make it openess different and conceive of it through closure, for if it is all that there is, has been, and will be, at once (modern science, in the broadest and non-traditionalist way, has taught us as much), our closures are its/our product. We are not openness.

Ultimately, it is clear that something can be known, I'll poke you in the eye to prove it.

So always uncertain, but never in doubt.

This is where the academic argument stops and the religious one begins (I am stupefied and hindered by such social requirements!).

Religiously, spiritually, and I commit, vitally as per Ortega y Gasset, I propose that there is no way to define openness, other than by dividing it into things through closure. Really, there is no way to define all that there is, was, and ever will be.

Mind must be social for something like that to happen, and this defines social in the most broadest of senses, including all that we have conceived of to date (all natural complexes, all biological and non-biological systems, astral, noumenal, nomothetic, dragons, fairies, all are included herein, the list extends ad infinitum relative to the notion of ontological parity).

And if we are non-anthropocentric and we understand and come to terms with the fact that there is mind in the ultimate existent (the world, universe and multiverse are all problematic terms), than there is conception separate from and beyond us, stratifed above us possible, or through us, whatever the case, we cannot describe what it potentially conceives, we cannot even think it.

Everyone knows this point in critical thinking and in spiritual life: where one understands that the best way to describe it, is by remaining silent.

I am that I am, it simply is.

Ah the rage and hope
of the ever divine
élan vital
organicum press